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 Implications of Increased Regional
 Concentration and Oligopsonistic
 Coordination in the Beef
 Packing Industry
 Azzeddine M. Azzam and John R. Schroeter
 This article proposes an oligopsony pricing model for projecting the effects of
 increased concentration or oligopsonistic coordination in beef packing using
 simulation methods. The model combines an explicit behavioral theory of packing
 firms with an attempt to respect the regional scope of cattle procurement markets.
 Our results indicate less danger of falling cattle prices, as a result of increased packer
 concentration or coordination, than do results from conventional econometric studies.
 Key words: beef packing, conjectural variation, oligopsony, regional concentration,
 simulation.
 Concern about the impact on live cattle prices
 of increased concentration in the beef packing
 industry has prompted several empirical stud-
 ies. Notable examples of relevant econometric
 work in the Bain tradition [hereafter, the
 "structure-conduct-performance (or SCP) ap-
 proach"] include Ward (1981, 1985); Menk-
 haus, St. Clair, and Ahmaddaud; and Quail et
 al.1 Other work, including Azzam and Pagou-
 latos; Schroeter (1988); and Schroeter and Az-
 zam, uses the conjectural variation approach
 to modeling equilibrium in homogeneous prod-
 uct oligopoly and tests for packer price-taking
 behavior in both factor and output markets.2
 Both approaches have the same objective: to
 The authors are, respectively, an associate professor in the De-
 partment of Agricultural Economics at the University of Ne-
 braska-Lincoln and an associate professor in the Department of
 Economics at Iowa State University.
 This is University of Nebraska Agricultural Experiment Station
 Journal Article No. 9197.
 The authors thank Professor Bruce Marion for providing data
 on regional concentration and cattle slaughter volumes and Jens
 Knutson of the American Meat Institute for providing the financial
 data.
 determine how recent (or future) increases in
 concentration have affected (or will affect) cat-
 tle prices. Each approach has its shortcomings,
 however.
 The SCP approach seeks to infer the degree
 of competition in cattle procurement markets
 through ad hoc models relating a performance
 measure (live cattle price) to structural char-
 acteristics (including concentration) using re-
 gional data. The structural characteristics in
 the empirical models are supplemented by
 other components believed by the investigator
 to affect performance. The problem is that the
 models are not explicitly connected to behav-
 ior at the firm level. To begin, the manner in
 which variables are chosen for use in estima-
 tion is often "more akin to a literature search
 for a list of possible variables than the devel-
 opment of a coherent structure-performance
 model" (Sawyer, p. 296). More fundamentally,
 the models and estimation procedures fail to
 test or impose important restrictions implied
 by theory (Schroeter 1990). As a result, the
 empirical estimates from the SCP approach
 come with no guarantee of consistency with a
 coherent model of rational firm conduct.
 The conjectural variation approach, on the
 other hand, is explicitly theory based. "The
 behavioral equations by which firms set price
 1 This literature is aptly summarized by Ward (1988). Connor
 also reviews this literature and analyzes concentration issues in
 the beef industry in general.
 2 For a comprehensive review of these types of models, see Bres-
 nahan or Gero ski.
 Western Journal of Agricultural Economics, 16(2): 374-381
 Copyright 1991 Western Agricultural Economics Association
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 and quantity (are) . . . estimated, and param-
 eters of those equations . . . directly linked to
 analytical notions of firm and industry con-
 duct" (Bresnahan, p. 1012). The problem here
 is that, to date, applications of the conjectural
 variation approach to the problem of testing
 competitive behavior in the beef industry have
 not adequately addressed the fact that relevant
 cattle procurement markets are regional, not
 national, in scope.
 This article proposes an alternative, non-
 econometric, procedure for projecting the price
 effects of increased concentration or oligop-
 sonistic coordination in beef packing. It com-
 bines an explicit behavioral theory of beef
 packing firms with an attempt to respect the
 regional scope of competition in cattle pro-
 curement. The behavioral model is used to
 derive the relationships among structure, firm
 conduct, and performance in cattle markets.
 Not all of the current values of the structure/
 conduct/performance parameters are directly
 observable, however, so the model first must
 be calibrated using estimates of these before it
 can serve as a basis for simulations of the per-
 formance effects of future changes in structure
 or conduct. Our simulation results suggest
 somewhat less danger of falling cattle prices
 due to increasing concentration than do the
 results of conventional econometric studies
 utilizing the SCP approach.
 A Model of Oligopsony Pricing in
 Regional Cattle Markets
 Let AT denote the number of cattle procurement
 regions. Each packer in every region is as-
 sumed to be a perfect competitor in a common
 national output market with price p? Denote
 the annual output of packer j in region k by
 qkj. Adopting the convention of measuring cat-
 tle inputs in carcass weight equivalent units,
 qkj also represents the annual livestock input
 of packer j in region k. The market inverse
 cattle supply function in region k is given by
 wk = g(Qk' where wk is the price of cattle in
 Nk
 region k, Qk = 2 Qkj is total cattle sales volume
 for the year in region k, and Nk is the number
 of packers in region k. If the 7th packer in the
 fcth region has processing cost function Ckj(qkJ),
 then the packer's annual profit is given by
 -*kj = (P - wk)Qkj - Ckj(qkj).
 Packers choose their cattle input quantities
 to maximize profit. A firm with market power
 will internalize the effect that its choice of
 quantity will have on regional quantity and,
 in turn, on regional cattle price. The first-order
 condition for profit maximization is obtained
 by differentiating the profit function with re-
 spect to qkj and setting the result equal to zero,
 yielding
 (1) P - Ckj(qk) -wk = <M ||]0 + K)'
 d 2 Qki
 Here, A*. = - L~ - and can be interpreted as
 dqkj
 they'th firm's conjecture regarding its regional
 rivals' responses to a change in its own input.
 In effect, A*, identified the 7th firm's degree of
 market power. But rather than work with the
 firm-specific A^, we follow Clarke and Davies
 in adopting a parametrization of them that
 leads to region-specific conduct indices. As-
 sume that the behavior of each firm in region
 k is consistent with the expectation that its
 rivals' proportionate quantity responses will
 all be a constant multiple, say ak, of its own
 proportionate change. That is,
 ^ = afe' forall ¡+j
 Qki ' qkj 1
 or
 ^-«♦W forali/*/
 Substituting this expression into the definition
 of A^ yields
 (2) Xkj = jQ±- A
 'Qkj I
 Defined this way, ak provides an index, with
 values between zero and one, of the degree of
 firms' implicit coordination in the kih regional
 cattle market. A value of zero for ak can be
 identified with firms anticipating no responses
 to their output adjustments. This is Cournot
 conduct, the polar case of noncooperative be-
 havior. When ak is set to one, equations (2)
 and ( 1 ) imply that output price minus marginal
 3 This may not be a tenable assumption. However, since most
 of the attention seems to have focused on market power in pro-
 curement markets rather than output markets, we proceed ac-
 cordingly.
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 processing cost is equal to marginal factor cost
 computed from the region's aggregate cattle
 supply curve. Thus, ak = 1 signals perfect cattle
 market collusion among region fc's packers.4
 Substituting (2) into (1) and multiplying by
 the yth firm's market share yields
 -(t){fej-[(s)-fe)1-
 Summing over firms in the kth region and di-
 viding by wk yields
 P- Ck-Wk = [<*k- Hk{ak - 1)]
 Wk *k
 where ck is a market-share weighted average
 of region fc's packers' marginal processing costs,
 ek is the elasticity of cattle supply in region k,
 Nk / '2
 and Hk = 2 |f is the Herfindahl index of ;-l 'Qk)
 concentration in region k.
 Under the assumption of a competitive out-
 put market, p - ck is the value of the marginal
 product of cattle net of packers' average mar-
 ginal processing costs. Since this would equal
 the factor price under competition, (p - ck -
 wk)/wk provides a relative measure of the oli-
 gopsony distortion in region fc's cattle market.
 Denoting this by Dk, we have
 [ak - Hk{ak - 1)]
 Dk~ 7k -
 Notice that, for given values of the conduct
 parameter, ak, and supply elasticity, ek, the dis-
 tortion increases with concentration, Hk. Thus
 increasing concentration worsens performance
 even with completely noncooperative, or
 Cournot, conduct. For given conduct and con-
 centration, the distortion decreases as supply
 elasticity increases. Thus even tightly coordi-
 nated oligopsony becomes less distortionary as
 supply responsiveness grows. Finally, for a giv-
 en concentration and supply elasticity, the dis-
 tortion increases as ak increases and approach-
 es the pure monopsony level, (l/ek), as ak
 approaches the value of one consistent with
 perfect collusion. Specifically, when ak= l,Hk
 drops out of the expression: In a joint profit-
 maximizing input buyers' cartel, market per-
 formance is independent of buyer concentra-
 tion. From (3), a quantity weighted average of
 regional oligopsony price distortions can be
 formed as
 (4) D-$ Dk%
 _ « (ak-Hk(ak- l)'Qk
 è' ek )q>
 K
 where Q = 2 ôit is national cattle sales vol-
 k='
 ume.
 The starting point of each simulation re-
 ported in the next section is a "baseline case"
 which combines estimates of regional quan-
 tities and concentration indices, Qks and Hks9
 with assumed values for the current conduct
 parameters, &ks, and an estimate of the na-
 tional average oligopsony distortion, D, formed
 from industry financial data. Each baseline case
 is a candidate description of the current situ-
 ation in the industry. Assuming that supply
 elasticities are constant across regions, equa-
 tion (4) can be used to solve for the common
 value of e that is consistent with any particular
 baseline case:
 (5) ¿=-z?iÈ[àk-Hk(âk- l)]ßto u'¿ k='
 K
 where Q = 2 Ô*.
 7=1
 Establishing a baseline case enables com-
 parison with "test cases." These will be char-
 acterized by sets of prospective future values
 for concentration and conduct parameters,
 Hfs, and afs. Assuming that regional supply
 elasticities will be unaffected by changes in
 packer concentration or conduct, the regional
 and national average price distortions corre-
 sponding to the test case are
 4 The collusion we have in mind is implicit collusion. As Posner
 (p. 40) explained, "in some circumstances competing [firms] might
 be able to coordinate their pricing without conspiring in the usual
 sense of the term- that is, without any overt or detectable acts of
 communication. This is the phenomenon that lawyers call con-
 scious parallelism and some economists call oligopolistic inter-
 dependence, but I prefer to call implicit collusion in contrast to
 explicit collusion of the formal cartel or its underground counter-
 part."
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 (6) Df = at - HUaf - 1)
 and
 (7) D* = 2 Df%.
 D* is the estimate of the national average
 oligopsony distortion that would result due to
 the test case's hypothetical changes in concen-
 tration and/or conduct.5 The corresponding ef-
 fects on national cattle sales volume and av-
 erage price can be projected given assumptions
 about the aggregate (that is, national) supply
 and demand curves.6 Assume constant elas-
 ticity forms for the national market's cattle
 supply curve,
 (8) Q = bwe, e > 0,
 and derived demand curve
 (9) Q = dw' 77 < 0.
 At this point, normalize by setting current, or
 baseline case, values of price and quantity to
 1 and 100, respectively.7 As figure 1 illustrates,
 the supply price at Q = 100 will then be w =
 1 while the derived^ demand price at this quan-
 tity will be (1 + D), where D is the estimate
 of the current distortion. Substituting these
 values into equations (8) and (9) and solving
 for b and d yields
 b= 100 and d= 100(1 + D)'
 Denote the test case projections of the national
 market quantity and average price by Q* and
 w*, respectively. Again referring to figure 1 , the
 point with these coordinates must lie on the
 supply curve:
 e* = ioo(w*k
 Moreover, since Q* and w* must be consistent
 with an oligopsony distortion of D*, the de-
 w
 (1 + D*)w*
 ' Supply
 l + D
 W = l
 W*
 jfK j Demand
 Q* 6 = 100
 Figure 1. A model for calculating price and
 quantity impacts of changing structure and
 conduct
 mand price at Q* must be w*(l + Z>*):
 Q* = 100(1 + /))-"[ w*(l + D*)]'
 Solving the last two equations for Q* and w*
 yields
 fl + D*]~i
 (io) Q* = ioo[-nr5-J fl + D*]~i
 and
 fl + D*]~»
 Simulations
 The first step in performing the simulations is
 to establish the parameters of the baseline case.
 Bruce Marion provided 1986 data for the re-
 gional Herfindahl indices and annual slaughter
 volumes for the 1 3 fed cattle marketing regions
 described in Quail et al. These appear to bé
 the most recent and detailed numbers for re-
 gional beef packing concentrations and market
 shares (table 1). We use them as baseline es-
 timates, //¿s and Qks, of the Hks and Qks. For
 estimates of the elasticities of the national de-
 rived demand and supply curves for cattle, we
 adopt the figures r¡ = -.53 and ê = 1.68 ob-
 tained by Schroeter (1988) using annual data.
 Baseline case estimates of the national av-
 erage oligopsony distortion, D, and the re-
 gional conduct parameters, aks, are also re-
 quired. The test cases are designed to address
 5 The expression of D* in equation (7) embodies the assumption
 that equilibrium regional market shares in the test case will not
 be significantly different from those for the baseline case.
 6 Projecting the impact on quantities and prices in individual
 regions is a trickier matter not undertaken here. It clearly would
 be incorrect to simply move back along stationary regional supply
 curves until points were reached at which the estimated distortions,
 the £>?s, just "fit" between perfectly elastic demand curves and
 the supply curves. This would ignore the interdependence among
 regional supply curves as well as output price effects. By limiting
 attention to national quantity and (average) price, we avoid having
 to model the shifts in regional supply curves caused by price changes
 in adioinine reeions.
 7 This technique is patterned after a similar exercise in Dickson
 and Yu.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.188 on Fri, 29 Jul 2016 17:48:02 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 378 December 1991 Western Journal of Agricultural Economics




 Region Indexb head)b
 (k) Geographical Description8 (H¿ (Q*)
 1 All of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana west of the Continental Di- .5086 1,328
 vide
 2 Northern California and Reno, Nevada .3369 363
 3 Southern California and Arizona .1505 821
 4 New Mexico and southwest Texas .77 1 8 23
 5 All of Colorado, western Nebraska, and the southeastern corner of Wyoming .3044 1,842
 6 North and South Dakota and Montana east of the Continental Divide .4620 438
 7 Wisconsin, most of Minnesota, and northern Illinois .3063 1,647
 8 Iowa, eastern Nebraska, southern Minnesota, and Rockport, Missouri .2068 6,386
 9 Kansas (excluding the southwest corner), the western half of Missouri, and a .7277 1,087
 northern slice of Oklahoma
 1 0 Southwest corner of Kansas, the Oklahoma panhandle, the Texas panhandle, .2 1 43 9,999
 and three counties (Curry, Quay, and Union) in New Mexico
 1 1 Remainder of Texas (excluding those parts in regions 4 and 10) and Oklaho- .1685 665
 ma (excluding the parts in regions 9 and 10)
 12 Eastern Missouri and southern Illinois .3241 67
 13 Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio .0893 456
 * These are rough geographical descriptions. Readers interested in the precise boundaries of the regions should refer to Quail et al.
 b These data were provided by Bruce Marion.
 current concerns about growing concentration
 or worsening oligopsonistic conduct. That is,
 they are characterized by af > ak and Hf >
 Hk. We deliberately bias our results in the di-
 rection of large apparent impacts by assuming
 current conduct is described by the noncoop-
 erative extreme, ak = 0 for all k.
 D represents a weighted average of regional
 values of (p - ck - wk)/wk. Our estimate of it
 is based on industry financial data. Assuming
 that marginal (economic) costs are well ap-
 proximated by average (accounting) costs, D
 can be estimated as before-tax earnings [rev-
 enue minus the sum of processing (or "oper-
 ating") costs and livestock costs] as a propor-
 tion of livestock costs. The American Meat
 Institute (AMI) conducts annual financial sur-
 veys of meat packing firms in the U.S. Its An-
 nual Financial Reviews of the Meat Packing
 Industry for 1979 through 1986 report figures
 for beef packers' operating costs that average
 11.1 2% of sales and for livestock costs that av-
 erage 87.62% of sales. Our baseline estimate
 of the distortion, therefore, is (100 - 11.12-
 87.62)/87.62 or 1.44%. Schroeter (1988) esti-
 mated oligopsony distortions in beef packing
 econometrically without reference to industry
 financial data. The simple average of his dis-
 tortion estimates for the years 1979 through
 1983 (the last year of his sample) is 1.03%.
 The close correspondence between this figure
 and the present method's estimate of 1.44% is
 reassuring.
 These values for D, and for ãk, Hk, and Qk
 for k = 1 , 2, . . . , 1 3, are inserted into equation
 (5) to obtain an estimate of the representative
 regional supply elasticity that is consistent with
 the baseline case's embedded assumptions
 about the national average distortion and re-
 gional conduct, concentration, and market
 shares. The resulting estimate is e = 18.3. Ob-
 viously, this figure is much larger than any
 plausible estimate of the national average sup-
 ply elasticity. Regional supply responses,
 though, reflect not only production responses
 but also cattle producers' opportunities to shift
 supplies among regions, in the short term, in
 response to transport-cost-compensated price
 differentials. The large magnitude of? suggests
 that these opportunities are extensive.8 None-
 theless, sensitivity of our results to the mag-
 8 Studies of dynamic comovements among regional cattle prices
 provide indirect evidence of the extent of spatial arbitrage. Schroe-
 der and Goodwin found that price shocks in the eastern Nebraska
 market (in our region 8) trigger contemporaneous (same week)
 price reactions in the Texas panhandle (in our region 10) of at least
 70% of the initial shock. Moreover, the Texas price adjustment to
 the Nebraska price shock is completed in only two weeks.
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 nitude of regional supply elasticity will be dis-
 cussed.
 In any particular simulation, the test case's
 values for the afs and the Hfs are then com-
 bined with î in equation (6) to project regional
 distortions for the test case. These are averaged
 in equation (7) to obtain D*, the projected na-
 tional average distortion. Finally, D and D*
 are combined with estimates of e and rj in equa-
 tions (10) and (1 1) to determine average price
 and quantity effects.
 Table 2 presents the results of simulations
 for two different test cases. The last two col-
 umns of the table give projections of test case,
 or "future," values for cattle market quantity
 and price. Recall that baseline, or "current,"
 values of these variables are normalized to 100
 and 1, respectively. The first line of the table
 projects the effects of increasing concentration
 to the extent of raising each regional Herfin-
 dahl index to the level H4 = .77 1 8, the highest
 measured value in 1986, while preserving
 completely noncooperative (Cournot) behav-
 ior in all regions.9 Reference to table 1 shows
 that the degree of consolidation necessary to
 bring the industry to this level of concentration
 would be extensive: in 1986, the four largest
 regions (regions 5, 7, 8, and 10 with a collective
 market share of nearly 80%) each had Herfin-
 dahl index values of less than half of H4. Re-
 gion 9 is the only region with a 1986 Herfin-
 dahl index value approaching that of region 4,
 but regions 9 and 4 together accounted for only
 4.5% of slaughter. The projected quantity and
 price effects associated with this very signifi-
 cant change, 1.08% and .64% respectively, are
 relatively small, however.
 Of course, it is natural to suspect that the
 result of increased concentration would be not
 merely a less competitive Cournot equilibrium
 but an outcome reflecting greater concentra-
 tion and a greater degree of oligopsonistic co-
 ordination. The second line of table 2 simu-
 lates the effects of a transition from Cournot
 conduct in all regions to pure monopsony in
 all regions. This represents the perfectly col-
 lusive limiting case of market coordination.
 When all a?s = 1, concentration, measured by
 the //£s, is irrelevant. Even for this extreme
 scenario, the magnitudes of the changes seem
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 9 Herfindahl indices, sums of squared market shares, are oñen
 reported as whole numbers. We write them as decimals because
 this is how they enter our equations.
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 These results are based on the estimates D
 = .0144, ê = 1.68, and Í) = -.53, all of which
 are subject to challenge. We briefly consider
 the effects of changes in these values. Equa-
 tions (5), (6), and (7) show that, with other
 parameters of the baseline and test cases held
 fixed, an increase in D will lead to an equi-
 pjoportional increase in D*. But since D* >
 D, the ratio (1 + D*)/( 1 + D) will increase
 and, since the exponents in equations (10) and
 (1 1) are negative, Q* and w* will fall; that is,
 the projected quantity and price effects, 100 -
 Q* and 1 - w*, will increase. Intuitively, a
 greater value of D can be reconciled with given
 baseline conduct assumptions only through a
 reduction in the estimate of the regional supply
 elasticity. The test case's increase in concen-
 tration or coordination will be more distor-
 tionary when coupled with the new lower elas-
 ticity estimate.
 Differentiating equations (10) and (11) with
 respect to e and rj for given D* and D, yields
 dQVde < 0, dQVdv, dw*/de, and dwVdv >
 0. Thus, increasing ê, other things being equal,
 will decrease Q* and increase u>*; that is, in-
 crease the projected quantity effect and de-
 crease the projected price effect. These results
 can be seen in figure 1 by visualizing the effects
 of a clockwise rotation of the supply curve
 about the point (Q,>v). As supply becomes more
 elastic, preserving the same test case distor-
 tion, £>*, requires that Q* fall and w* rise.
 Similarly, increasing r¡ in absolute value de-
 creases Q* and w* thus increasing both quan-
 tity and price effect projections. This can be
 seen by visualizing a counter-clockwise rota-
 f tion of figure 1 's demand curve about the point
 (ß,l + D). As demand becomes more elas-
 tic, preserving a given value of D* for the test
 case distortion requires that Q* and w* both
 fall. The observations of this and the previous
 paragraph imply that "large" projected quan-
 tity impacts will obtain with "high" values of
 e, |r)|, and D, while "large" projected price
 impacts will obtain with a "low" value of ê
 and "high" values of 'r¡' and D.
 Lines 3 and 4 in table 2 report the results of
 simulations for the two test cases considered
 above but with different baseline values for D,
 ê, and | r¡ ' . Values of ê and | ?} | were set at twice
 our original estimates. Any error in our esti-
 mate of D would most likely have entered
 through the associated estimate of marginal
 processing cost: 11.12% of average revenue.
 Halving this figure leads to the estimate, D =
 (100 - 5.56 - 87.62)/87.62 = 7.79%.10 This
 provides the value of D used in lines 3 and 4
 of table 2. These choices for ê, 'r¡', and D,
 favoring a large quantity effect, do generate the
 prediction of a 13.74% decline in volume as
 the result of a transition to pure regional mo-
 nopsony.
 Lines 5 and 6 of the table pertain to the same
 test cases and, once again, the values for D and
 | ?) | used in lines 3 and 4. This time, however,
 the estimate of ê is one-half of its original level.
 These choices, favoring a large price impact,
 achieve effects on price as large as 9.73% in
 the pure monopsony case.
 Discussion and Conclusions
 It is important, at this point, to reiterate the
 assumptions upon which our projections are
 based. First, the entire analysis takes static prof-
 it maximization as the maintained hypothesis
 and this, to be sure, is a theoretical limitation
 of our approach. If the dominant motivation
 of packing firms were some other goal, for ex-
 ample, profit-constrained market share max-
 imization or any type of intertemporal objec-
 tive, our results would be suspect. Second, all
 of the parameters characterizing the model's
 baseline case must be estimated and all of our
 estimation procedures (except perhaps the use
 of the Marion data for the Hks and the Qks)
 are subject to challenge. For this reason, we
 investigated the sensitivity of the procedure to
 alternative choices for D, ê, and r¡.
 How do our results compare with those ob-
 tained using other methods? The three most
 often cited econometric studies of the effects
 of packer concentration on regional cattle pro-
 curement are Ward (1981); Menkhaus, St.
 Clair, and Ahmaddaud; and Quail et al. As
 Connor notes in his summary of these studies,
 they are in general agreement with respect to
 magnitudes of price effects. Each of them finds
 a price range between the samples' least and
 most concentrated market areas/time periods
 of 1.2% to 2.5% of the price level. In the sim-
 ulations reflecting our judgment about "most
 plausible" parameter values (lines 1 and 2 of
 table 2), price effects are less than 1%. Note
 that the Ward/Menkhaus, St. Clair, and Ah-
 maddaud/Quail et al. price effects represent
 differences between the least and the most con-
 centrated market areas present in their sam-
 10 The corresponding estimate of regional supply elasticity, e, is
 3.39.
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 pies. It is highly unlikely that firm conduct
 across these areas actually spanned the range
 delineated by the baseline and test cases of the
 simulation reported in line 2 of table 2: from
 completely noncooperative to perfectly mo-
 nopsonistic. Yet our projected price effects are
 smaller than their measurements. Therefore,
 our results indicate less danger of falling cattle
 prices, as a result of increased packer concen-
 tration or coordination, than do those from
 conventional econometric studies.11
 The fact that our method produces small
 estimates of price impacts is primarily attrib-
 utable to our high estimate of regional supply
 elasticity. In order to reconcile reasonable es-
 timates of the current distortion with even
 completely noncooperative current conduct, a
 very high value of the elasticity of regional
 supply is required. High supply elasticities lim-
 it packers' abilities to benefit from concentra-
 tion or input market coordination. Just as mo-
 nopoly behavior becomes decreasingly
 "monopoly like" as demand elasticity increas-
 es, very high supply elasticities make even pure
 monopsony conduct relatively ineffectual, at
 least with respect to price effects.
 It should be noted, however, that even quite
 small price effects can have significant effects
 on packer and feeder profit. AMI figures for
 the years 1979-86 report that livestock costs
 were nearly 88%, and before-tax earnings only
 about 1 .25%, of total beef packing sales during
 this period. Thus a fall in cattle prices of only
 .5% has the potential to increase packers' profit
 by about 35%. Iowa Cooperative Extension
 Service figures (Futrell) estimate the returns
 from finishing yearling steers to Choice slaugh-
 ter grade to have been approximately $49/head
 in the fourth quarter of 1990. The same .5%
 decline amounts to a $4.40/head profit loss on
 a 1,100 pound steer at $80/cwt. In other
 words, feeders' profit would decrease by nearly
 9%.
 [Received April 1990; final revision
 received July 1991.]
 1 ' The results of our sensitivity analysis do qualify this conclu-
 sion somewhat. As lines 5 and 6 of table 2 demonstrate, large price
 effect projections can be generated using parameter estimates sig-
 nificantly different from our "most plausible*' values.
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